As the main producers of managerial elites, business schools represent strategic research sites for understanding the formation of economic practices and representations. This article draws on historical material to analyze the changing place of economics in American business education over the course of the twentieth century. We use the Wharton School as an illustration of the earliest trends and dilemmas (c. 1900-1930), when business schools found themselves caught between their business connections and their striving for moral legitimacy in higher education. We show how several of the school's leaders were closely involved in progressive reforms and presided over the development of the empirical social sciences to address questions of labor regulation and control within manufacturing industries. Next, we look at the creation of the Carnegie Tech Graduate School of Industrial Administration after World War II. This episode illustrates the increasingly successful claims of social scientists, backed by philanthropic foundations, on business education and the growing appeal of "scientific" approaches to decision-making and management. We also show that these transformations were homologically related to changes in the prevailing mode of governance in the American economy: business schools became essential sites for the development of tools and methods for the management of the new large, diversified conglomerates (input-output approaches, linear programming,
With hindsight, no transformation looks as consequential for the history of American higher education-and perhaps American society-as the extraordinary rise of business schools and business degrees in the twentieth century. Started around the 1900s as vocational programs dominated by practitioners with claims to moral leadership and ethical progress, business education has turned into a large and highly organized field controlled by disciplines with scientific claims. The first notable change was quantitative: in 1920, 1,576 students graduated from American universities with a BA in business; by 1940, the number had climbed to 18,549; by 1950 by , it reached 72,137 (Silk 1960 ; by 2001, no less than 266,000 students, or 21 percent of all BAs, were exiting American higher education with a business degree-a far greater proportion than the 13 percent who did so in the 1940s (US Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics). Transformations at the graduate level were even more striking: The number of MBAs went from 110 in 1919 to 5,205 in 1958 5,205 in . Between 1960 5,205 in and 1980 , MBA education grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent. More than 55,000 MBAs were granted in 1981, surpassing the total number of law and medical schools' degrees combined. In 2006, the number of MBAs awarded annually in the United States exceeded 120,000 (Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB)). Once an almost exclusively American phenomenon, the MBA degree is now granted in more than 100 countries and well on its way to becoming a globalized credential (Moon 2002 ).
The second significant change was qualitative. Business schools have evolved from being dominated by practitioners and struggling for academic legitimacy to become the largest employers of disciplinary trained social scientists, sometimes rivaling traditional departments in the size and distinction of their faculty. of increasingly large contingents of economics PhDs has turned business schools into formidable players within economic science itself-a transformation that is attested by the remarkable string of Nobel Prizes in economic science awarded to business school scholars since 1990 (Fourcade 2008) .
Broadly speaking, we can identify three historical (though partly overlapping) trends in the transformation of the American business school over the course of the twentieth century. In the early phase, which begins with the creation of the Wharton School at the end of the nineteenth century, the business school was seen primarily as a vocational institution with a moral dimension. Its curriculum was shaped by the dominant institutionalist understanding of economic life in which practical problems in industry (for instance questions of scale, anti-trust, government regulation and, most prominently, labor relations) occupied a place of choice. Courses were practically oriented, and indeed often taught by practitioners without specialized degrees, such as engineers (for example, Frederick Taylor, the father of scientific management, at the Tuck school) or accountants (for example, George O. May of Price Waterhouse).
A second phase begins in the 1950s and marks the advent of a new vision of the contribution of business to society with the rise of 'management science.' Characteristically, this scientization of the business disciplines did not originate in the core (which remained faithful to more institutionalist approaches) but at a brand new institution striving for academic legitimacy, the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at the Carnegie Institute of Technology. It is there that institutional mavericks with a background in operations research transplanted the decision-making techniques they had crafted for government and the military during World War II to the new corporate forms (for example, large, diversified conglomerates) of the post-war era.
The third phase, which we illustrate here by the rise of the Chicago Graduate School of Business, but really cuts across many other institutions, signals the triumph of neoclassical economics in all business matters.
It is associated not only with the widespread institutionalization of a strong core of economists within business schools, but also with new developments in economic analysis (for example, financial engineering, agency theory, or transaction-cost economics). We argue that this transformation helped produce and sustain new understandings about the nature of the firm, with far-reaching consequences for the discipline of economics and for economic relations in society.
To be sure, economists were prominently involved in all three phases of this process: as we will see, they laid claims on business education from the very beginning. But the long term trend is unmistakably one of increased, if contested, interpenetration between economics and business, particularly noticeable in the most recent period. From representing one subject among others at the turn of the century, economics has become the largest discipline found in business schools; in addition, it has come to exert commanding influence on all other aspects of the business curriculum-including organization studies, marketing, operations, strategy, and most important of all, finance. Conversely, the association with business education has transformed economics in important ways, both in terms of the discipline's economic standing and in terms of its substantive orientations. It also has had consequences for changing the paradigm about the purpose of the corporation and the power relations among various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations in ways that favor the interests of owners of economic capital.
In this chapter, we suggest that the co-evolution of economics and business studies in the twentieth century must be analyzed as an instance of "linked professional ecologies." Abbott (2005) developed this concept to account for jurisdictional developments that take place in several different professions at once [hinges, in Abbott's terminology], or through the expansion of an existing profession into a new ecology [avatars] . Medical licensing, which serves to develop both a medical jurisdiction within society and a licensing jurisdiction within the state, is an example of a hinge. The migration of an academic discipline such as economics into the applied world of professional practice is an example of an avatar. The production of an avatar, however, is not straightforward and automatic. Rather, it is an eminently political process, resulting from the mobilization of individuals and institutions around particular professional tasks and involving a complex array of convergent legitimating projects. This chapter is about one of the projects that helped establish the business avatar of economics in twentieth century America: the institutionalization of economics' claims with respect to business-relevant knowledge and the training of businessmen.
THE MORAL EDUCATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN
It is important to disentangle the vast expansion of business education at the undergraduate level, which mainly occurred in public universities, from the much more exclusive form, which institutionalized in private universities around a graduate-level only curriculum (Veysey 1965; Jencks & Riesman 1969) . In the first case, the development of colleges of business seems to have been largely conceived as a response to public demands in a competitive environment, as well as a natural extension of the "practical" mission laid out in many of these universities' public charter. Private universities, by contrast, pioneered the concept of the business school as the privileged training ground for what they defined as the emerging new tasks of management, understood to apply very broadly-the corporation, indeed, was just one outlet for this training, along with public service and philanthropic work. Modeled after other established professional schools, 1 business schools at elite universities (Harvard, Penn, Chicago, Dartmouth…) were to recruit educated liberal arts undergraduates and turn them into moral leaders with administrative competence. They saw themselves as gateways into the elite, and crafted their institutional project accordingly. The creation of the first Master of Business Administration by Harvard in 1908, the drive toward professionalization (with the establishment of doctoral programs in business, special reviews, and associations during the 1920s), the conscious choice to confine business education to the graduate level at Dartmouth (1900 ), Harvard (1908 ), later Chicago (1946 , Columbia (1952), and Carnegie Tech (1952) , were all efforts to protect the selectivity and exclusivity of management training, to affirm its status and seriousness of purpose vis-à-vis the rest of the university, and to establish the scientific rigor of management as a discipline.
While we are well aware of the pervasive influence of business schools in undergraduate education throughout the country, we want to focus our attention on those institutions that have dominated this field over the course of its history, and provided the institutional and intellectual models others have tried to emulate.
Because the topic of the transformation of business education over time is vast and complex, we have chosen to limit our analysis to a small number of institutions, which we see as characteristic of the broader patterns within each period. Partly because of its status as the world's oldest such institution, we begin this history with the Wharton School. We use this example to illustrate early trends in American business education, when the newly created institutions were still trying to define their place within the broader field of higher education and often facing profound dilemmas between their business connections and their striving for moral legitimacy.
Certainly these dilemmas played out differently in different places. But, in a way more broadly characteristic of the Progressive period, their solution always involved professionalization and the search for moral grounding. It is during the earlier part of the twentieth century, for instance, that business ethics emerged and flourished (Abend 2008) , and that the ideology of professions as normative institutions (Parsons 1939) Administration at the more recent (1892) University of Chicago, were more conservative and remained committed to the liberal arts as the normal foundation of business education-as of any form of education. The Wharton School stood somewhere between these two extremes and emphasized the empirical social sciences, which seemed then to offer a path between practical relevance and moral education-but also, as we will see, exposed the institution to political criticism from unsympathetic constituencies.
The creation of the Carnegie Tech Graduate School of Industrial Administration after World War II illustrates the second phase in our historical narrative. It is through this example that we discuss the increasingly successful claims of social scientists, backed by philanthropic foundations, on business education and the growing appeal, in the 1950s, of "scientific" approaches to decision-making and management. Gone were the days when the liberal arts were seen as relevant to the education of American businessmen.
Rationality was the new modus operandi, and what was now called the "behavioral sciences" 2 seemed to offer the greatest promise for solving the problems of American society and economy. As we show in this chapter, these transformations were also homologically related to changes in the prevailing mode of governance in the American economy: in particular, business schools became essential sites for the development of tools and methods for the management of the new large, diversified conglomerates (input-output approaches, linear programming, forecasting), which had developed as a result of economic mobilization during World War II.
Finally, the rise of the Chicago Business School-which really begins in the late 1950s-marks the decisive ascendance of economics, and particularly finance, over the other social-scientific disciplines laying claims on the business curriculum. Conversely, the diffusion of "Chicago-style" economics toward business schools also became a powerful vehicle for the transformation of the field of economics itself. It helped produce both the microeconomic turn in modern economic analysis and the emergence of narrowly financial understandings of the firm, which would ultimately help re-orient business practices toward what Fligstein (1990) has termed the "financial" conception of the firm, or the idea that the sole purpose of management and the essential social mission of the corporation are the maximization of shareholder value.
BUSINESS EDUCATION BETWEEN VOCATIONALISM AND PROGRESSIVISM
When the first colleges of administration, commerce, accounting, and finance were established at the turn of the twentieth century, economics almost instantly appeared as one of the natural foundations of the curriculum-for better or for worse. Writing in 1913, Leon C. Marshall, dean of the Chicago College of
Commerce and Administration, wrote of the school's beginnings in the following way: "this college succeeded in little more than making provision for the grouping of existing courses in economics and closely related subjects" (1913, p. 98) . Northwestern University's dean described the business school as "a very ill-defined institution. It may begin with the freshman year; it may start only after graduation from college; or it may start anywhere in between. It may represent courses in economics regrouped and relabeled, or it may omit all socalled economic courses and center exclusively on practical courses in administration" (Hotchkiss 1920, p. 92 ).
The fact is that the professors in charge of establishing business schools within the institutional framework of the university tended to approach the problem of business education from the point of view of the dominant academic perspective. In particular, they crafted the business curriculum around those disciplines that were then thought to embody the highest promise of social and moral progress, namely the social sciences. Marshall, again, was particularly explicit about this: students at the University of Chicago College of Commerce and Administration had to start their studies with a "broad cultural foundation" in the liberal arts, followed by a "broad survey of the social sciences," before receiving specialized instruction in one of three possible careers:
business, civic service, charitable and philanthropic service (Marshall 1913, p. 100) . More often than not, early business school leaders were social scientists themselves; indeed many (for example, James, Patten, and
McCrea at Wharton; Gay at Harvard; Laughlin and Marshall at Chicago; Day at Michigan) were professors of political economy, as the subject was then known. But they also aimed to appeal to business audiences, which they did by emphasizing the contribution of business to the progress of American society, and by privileging a relatively pragmatic-and easily transmitted-approach to economic and social questions.
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATIONS
It is in this context that a number of so-called "new school economists"-broadly progressive in their political outlook, interested in social reform, rejecting the abstract legacies of a certain Marshallianism in favor of a resolutely empirical approach to political economy, found themselves closely associated with the construction of business schools: Edwin Gay, the founding dean of Harvard Business School, was an economic historian (Heaton 1952) ; Edmund James, the first director of the Wharton School (1883-1896), was a railway and public utilities specialist. His successor at Wharton, Simon Patten (1896 -1912 , was an early promoter of experimental economics. All three had been trained in Europe.
The trajectory of Edmund James may serve as an illustration of the more general path. Trained in political economy in Germany during the heyday of the historical school, James was initially somewhat of a radical interested in social reform. Like his friends Richard T. Ely and Simon Patten, whom he had met on the old Continent, he was also a critic of the deductive approach to economics. And like them, James became an outspoken promoter of professionalization as a way to make policy advocacy publicly legitimate and acceptable (Furner 1975) . He was one of the original organizers of the American Economic Association in 1885, after the failure of an earlier venture, the Society for the Study of National Economy, which he and Patten had modeled after the German Verein fur Sozialpolitik. He was militantly involved in the movement to separate administration from politics and was a founder of the National Municipal League in 1894, a progressive organization which sought to make government less corrupt and more efficient. Finally, his campaign for rationalization included business-partly because the boundaries between public and "industrial" administration were not all that well drawn then anyway. Business, James argued, was as legitimate a subject of study as law and medicine, and as legitimate a venture point for rational social reform as any. Now that was a position that resonated well with the aspirations of the new wealthy elites.
In 1881, Joseph Wharton, a devout Quaker and successful Philadelphia industrialist, gave $100,000 to the University of Pennsylvania to establish a school of finance and commerce. view of society as opposed to the search for universal laws) but also the relationship between economics and politics. Simon Patten, also a Wharton professor and James' successor at the head of Wharton, was quite straightforward on the subject. According to him, there could be "no full discussion of economic problems without bringing political and moral principles into relation with the economic." In fact, Patten defined the laws of economics not as explanations, but instead as enumeration of "what qualities must be impressed upon men in the struggle for the higher civilization which the conditions of life permit" (Sass 1982, p. 100) . Under his leadership the Wharton school embarked on an ambitious program to study the social problems of the day.
As Furner (1975) and Ross (1991) have shown, the institutionalization of social science in American universities was a generally contested process, and business schools were no exception. Some of the initial enthusiasm in favor of the development of political economy at the University of Pennsylvania (certainly on Wharton's part, for instance) had been fueled by the desire to promote the protectionist doctrines of Philadelphia native economist Henry C. Carey. The fact that Patten was a staunch defender of protectionism had made him eminently attractive to Wharton-and indeed there is evidence that Patten spread the protectionist gospel quite effectively among his students (Sass 1982) . But the question of social reform was much more difficult to negotiate with the trustees, and on these matters Patten found himself, like many of his colleagues, much at odds with the interests of those who funded and controlled the university. Furner (1975) . 5 With Nearing gone, the "trustees encouraged a general exodus of Progressive economists" from Wharton. Patten himself, now seen as an unwanted agitator, was forced to resign in 1917 (Sass 1988, p. 139) .
Still, the Progressive ideology that rational expertise should be the main instrument of progress for American society had become well anchored. The point of social and economic reforms was not to make American society more just (though socialist overtones were certainly not absent from some Progressive writings), but more significantly to make its functioning moral and therefore more efficient. By the 1920s, this perspective received further vindication from philanthropic foundations and government agencies, in the form of commissioned projects and the founding of new, empirically oriented, research organizations. In
Washington, Secretary of Commerce (1921 -1927 ), then President (1928 -1932 , Herbert Hoover was enrolling social scientists into his new technocratic economic order (Barber 1985) and business schools officials actively sought the connection. In 1921 the first research center devoted to the study of the "economic and social Rockefeller Memorial (later integrated into the Rockefeller foundation) and "played a crucial role in tying together the SSRC to Rockefeller philanthropy" (Fisher 1993, p. 72) .
Where did all this leave the place of economics in the business curriculum during the interwar? In most places there remained a general, though perfunctory, agreement that economics-particularly the empirical, institutional economic knowledge so prized by philanthropic foundations and public institutionshad an essential role to play in business education. The lack of specialized training for business school faculty meant that economics graduates still provided a natural pool of educated men to recruit from. Moreover, some believed that keeping economics associated with business was essential if one wanted to avoid the growing schism between business schools and economics departments. Roswell McCrea, who followed Patten as Dean of the Wharton School, thus argued that:
"Economics, where ever else it may or may not belong, does belong in the school of business. Both business and economics need to be saved from themselves. Without the presence of economics in some vital form, the work of a school of business is likely to degenerate into detail description of business organization and procedure, with no organizing principle other than the possible one of search for effective competitive devices, and with no clear vision of the social goal of business activity. And economics, divorced from business, is too likely to spend itself either in closet philosophizing by traditional modes, altogether too little affected with a present interest, or in fortifying predilections regarding public policy with broadly garnered data too remote from the intimate, work-a-day world of fresh experience to yield much more than a crop of articles, books, and book reviews. If schools of business realize their opportunities, the economic theory of the future will grow out their researches and will be formulated by their teachers. The joining of socially motivated thinking with a knowledge of concrete, shifting reality, such as can be effected in a school of business, may well escape the puttering of the strict vocationalist on the one hand, and the futility of the closet philosopher on the other. The foundations of wise business policy can be laid in this as in no other way." (McCrea 1925, p. 222) 7
The ambitions voiced in this quote, however, were rarely achieved. Business schools and economics departments competed for students, and did not always work well with each other. Business courses rarely addressed broad social and economic questions and often developed on an ad hoc basis, as a response to practical demands and the concerns of employers in the local economy; and strong disagreements about the place of academic research at those institutions continued to divide the business education community.
The abysmal failure of American businesses to deliver prosperity after 1929, the foundations' aggressive promotion of social scientific research as a means to improve governance, and the activist stance of the Roosevelt administration in social and economic matters were in part responsible for the broad reevaluation of the place of business schools in American society and higher education that took place during the 1930s (Khurana 2007) . Schools throughout the entire field-not simply at elite institutions-began to approach their societal role in more elevated terms and to actively embrace academic research. For example, the University of Mississippi's business school, whose pre-Depression mission statement emphasized narrow technical skills, revised it to include the advancing of knowledge on "fundamental questions of economics and philosophy which influence the course of a dynamic age." The University of Oklahoma whose mission statement stressed the economic value of its degree prior to 1930 shifted to wanting to "enable [students] to understand the public problems, particularly those having to do with the interrelationships between different businesses, between business and government, and between the employer and employee." Similar changes could be found at the University of Michigan, New York University, and the University of California.
Economics had a role to play in this new environment, both to help restore the legitimacy of the corporation as a moral institution and to assist government at all levels in crafting a path out of the economic malaise (the New Deal administration attracted a unprecedented number of university social science graduates into government employment There is no question that many of these changes were symbolic, ceremonial acknowledgements that remained relatively decoupled from the still very vocational orientation of business courses and activitiesnothing but "glittering and general phrases, designed to command the respect of our academic colleagues, but having little reference to vocational or professional aims…", as the dean of Northwestern's fledgling business school put it. (AACSB 1926). After World War II, however, the true effects of this reorientation of business schools would be felt on a new scale, with academic scientism becoming much more central not only to the institutions' rhetoric about themselves, but also to their curriculum and understanding of their vocational mission. Characteristically, it took an outsider-a brand new institution not beholden to traditional methods and existing constituencies-to effect the change. But before we discuss how Carnegie-Tech changed business education, let us step back a little to consider the disciplinary and institutional environment that brought this small school to the center stage of business education in the 1950s.
FROM SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT TO MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
By the late 1950s, American economics had undergone a dramatic transformation. The dominant approach during the interwar, institutionalism, was on its way out, displaced by the rise of mathematical economics in the wake of the Keynesian revolution (Yonay 1998 "the method of comparative statics, meaning by this the investigation of changes in a system from one position of equilibrium to another without regard to the transitional process involved in the adjustment.
… This method of comparative statics is but one special application of the more general practice of scientific deduction in which the behavior of a system (possibly through time) is defined in terms of a given set of functional equations and initial conditions." (Samuelson 1947: 7-8) This did not, in fact, sit well with all audiences. Foundations officials were disheartened by the esoteric potential of the new economic approach. More importantly, segments of the business world were quite annoyed by the Keynesian orientations of the young generation of neoclassical economists. As Samuelson, again, put it, "Keynesianism was a naughty word politically long after the war," frequently lumped together with communism in right-wing circles (in Colander and Landreth 1996, p. 170) . Neoclassical economists, many business officials felt, had replaced the celebration of the private enterprise system and opposition to regulatory frameworks by a new fascination with macroeconomic aggregates and, as time progressed, a growing acceptance of government intervention in business matters (Bornemann 1957, pp. 135-136 (Collins 1978) .
But macroeconomics and regulation was not all that was important about the new face of economics in the post-war period. To a large extent, the most consequential developments for the future of business education came not from the consolidating neoclassical mainstream in universities, but from a rather unlikely source: the nebulae of institutions and research centers sponsored by the U.S. military. It is in this sector that we can identify the intellectual sources of a new "scientific"-that is, quantitative and highly technologicalapproach to management, to be taken up and systematized on a massive scale through the financial and moral influence of American foundations. The new era in the relationship between economics and business can thus be understood as the outcome of three joint developments: first, the emergence of "management science" as an outgrowth of the general transformation of the social sciences under the influence of operations research and military funding during and after World War II (Simon 1991; Mirowski 2002) ; second, the disciplinarization of the business curriculum, which reflects the institutionalization of a new power configuration in business school education largely driven by the Ford Foundation; and third, the emergence of the conglomerate model of corporate organization, which, as we will see, bore more than an "elective affinity" with the new techniques being developed in economic research circles. The dramatic success, barely a few years after its founding, of With the exception of Harvard, "which was lively and intrigued with the advantages of the new 'case method,"' Bach felt that most of the business school programs tended to be either applied general economics or simply a "how-to-do-it" picture of prevailing best practices among leading business firms. There was little in the way of participative learning. Little research was being done, and, where there were any at all, doctoral programs were weak. Business schools tended to be at the bottom of the academic pecking order, often ranking below programs in agriculture and education schools. Bach's vision for the GSIA represented a radical departure from existing practices. He saw business education as an extension of the social sciences, rooted in quantitative analysis and the behavioral disciplines (Bach 1960a) . As Herbert Simon put it in his autobiography, "Almost none of the founding fathers of GSIA had extensive backgrounds in management or business education. We were social scientists who had discovered in one way or another that organizational and business environments provide a fertile source of business ideas and who therefore did not regard basic and applied as antithetical terms" (Simon 1991, pp. 138-39 committed to the application of mathematical and statistical methods to decision-making, their attachments to economic orthodoxy were weak-indeed they were mainly involved in all sorts of applied projects (Bach 1960b ). Finally, their orientation toward business school education and research was competitive and opportunistic: "American business education at that time [was] a wasteland of vocationalism that needed to be transformed into science-based professionalism." (Simon 1991, p. 139) . The GSIA was to be the antithesis of all this and demonstrate the relevance of serious academic research to business education. 10 And truth to tell, transforming the business school into a social-scientific research powerhouse was a necessary precondition to making the distinctive scientific program these people envisioned academically legitimate. What was at stake in the GSIA experience was nothing less than the redefinition of the dominant form of intellectual capital in the field of business education, which would soon imply the replacement of business practitioners with corporate experience by academics trained in the social sciences. That transition, in turn, was permitted, first, by the mobilization of technical capabilities and the rhetoric of science; and, second, by the backing of other academics-dominated institutions, namely powerful philanthropic foundations.
In describing the qualifications for his school's faculty, Bach stated: "we wanted a block of faculty members to provide the disciplinary foundations for the applied fields to business. For this group, we preferred people from the disciplines (economics, political science, the behavioral sciences, operations research) and the quantitative methods (mathematics, computers, statistics, accounting)." 11 The GSIA also sought to recruit different people. Advanced training in quantitative analysis and a background in engineering were prerequisites for admission-in sharp contrast with Harvard Business School, where most of the MBAs had a liberal arts background. The master degree curriculum was built around four pillars: (1) organizational behavior, (2) economic analysis, (3) quantitative management science, and (4) business and society. Bach legitimated the place of economics in the following way: "It is essential for the businessman, as citizen and as civic leader, to understand the broad mechanism of the economic system in which his firm operates and to be able to think intelligently and independently in arriving at positions on major public policy issues. Second, economics can provide some tools, but only a modest part of the necessary tools, for making managerial decisions about the conduct of the firm'" (Bach 1956, p. 563 ).
Bach and his colleagues knew that their experiment at Carnegie was fraught with risk. However, they felt the risks were not associated with their approach per se, but with whether or not they would be able to overcome the liability of newness that confronts any new organization, especially one trying to differentiate itself from the existing group. While the school had been able to attract unique "human capital" and "financial capital," it lacked social recognition. Older, larger and well established institutions still dominated American business education, and GSIA administrators were well aware that their school's success depended on their ability to influence the outside world's perception of the quality of what was happening within its walls. But they managed to do so, as we will describe below, largely thanks to the providential backing of the richest and newest foundation in the world. It is, ultimately, the support of the Ford foundation that propelled the recently established and relatively small institution into the inner circle of American business schools, thus legitimating its pedagogical and research models and, correlatively, its faculty.
NEW CORPORATIONS, NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Before we analyze the process by which the Ford foundation became involved in supporting the new approach to business education promoted by the GSIA, we need to discuss the broader historical context in which this particular move occurred. Two points need special consideration here, one economic-the emergence of the large conglomerate (or firms operating in multiple industries) as the dominant economic institution-and the other political-the anti-communist obsession of the McCarthy era. Let us turn first to the economic transformation.
The economy that emerged out of World War II was a profoundly transformed one. Replacing the large, horizontally and vertically integrated corporations of the earlier twentieth century, the multidivisional, diversified conglomerate was now well on its way to become a dominant organizational form. Prior to the war more than 85 percent of all Fortune 500 companies operated in a single 2-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) code, by 1960 more than half of all Fortune 500 firms operated in multiple industries (Nohria 2002 ). Instead of trying to increase market share through efficient work organization and price leadership, the many firms that followed the new model sought to ensure their survival by growing sales and spreading risk across industries and product lines (Fligstein 1990) . In this changed environment, the management of supply chains and the forecasting of demand thus replaced labor productivity and labor process efficiency as the core problems faced by corporate decision-makers.
The management of the war, importantly, posed similar problems. As we saw earlier, military and state demands during the conflict freed up large amounts of resources for experimenting with resource allocation techniques and the development of statistical methods that would help foster a massive increase in production. Others followed a different path, and moved directly into the corporate world. Perhaps most notable there was the trajectory of Robert McNamara, who was hired from his teaching post at Harvard Business School to join an operating group in the Army Air Corps to plan for the wartime production of airplanes. Using the earliest computers being developed in government laboratories, McNamara used life expectancies of air crews, the application of stochastic simulation, queuing theory, and other new statistical techniques, to formulate acceptable kill ratios, bombing runs and airplane production runs. After the war, he brought his scientific language and planning, organization, and management control techniques to the Ford Motor
Company, as one of a small number of "Whiz Kids" hired to turnaround the corporation.
The GSIA experiment was thus not at all an isolated aberration-in fact it was part and parcel of a broader transformation of conceptions of control in corporations and government that had been ushered in by the move to a militarized economy. In this new understanding, managers were increasingly described as "systems designers," "information processors," and "programmers" involved in regulating the interfaces between the organization and its environment and bringing rational analysis to bear on a firm's problems, whatever they might be-quite a far cry from the problems of labor control that had dominated the preoccupations of managers and scholars' alike during the 1920s. A 1952 Business Week article describing the new managerial technologies proclaimed: "The day of the truly professional general management man isn't here yet, but it is not far away. That man will be trained for management in general, rather than in any one phase of business. He'll learn his technique in school, rather than on the job." 12 Armed with these new tools, proponents suggested, managers could work in an organization without knowing the details of its operations because what mattered was the structure and process of management decision-making.
The other reason why the reform of management seemed urgently needed in the 1950s was political.
Since the 1930s at least there was a strong sentiment among some government and business elites that capitalism had failed to deliver its promises, with dramatic consequences for the world. In the context of the cold war, these ideas were recast in a more explicitly political direction, as the necessity to suppress the growing influence of communist ideas. This implied that efforts had to be made to insure not only the competent management of the macro-economy-as the creation of economic advice organizations and think tanks during the 1940s attests-, but also that of corporations themselves. In a 1948 speech to business executives, Harvard Business School Dean Donald K. David (and soon to be chairman of the Ford Foundation), described effective managers as essential to capitalism's victory in the contest with communism:
"We face a long continuing struggle throughout the world for men's minds and indeed for men's souls…. In this conflict of systems, the best way to preserve our system is to make it work. To me the brightest ray of hope in these troubled times is my firm belief that the business men can and will measure up to the task." in the behavioral sciences throughout the 1950s, which sought to bridge the divide with economics and helped craft the distinctively interdisciplinary approach promoted by Ford. As for Bach, who was a member of the Ford Foundation's external advisory committee, he was recruited by Carroll to work closely with him on a strategy to achieve reforms in business education.
The strategy Carroll and Bach evolved was relatively straightforward: pour extraordinary amounts of resources into "good or promising schools of business (five were to be chosen) which would then be the instruments of change for the rest of the field." Given the amount of money involved, it was felt that the institutions would quickly fall in line with Ford's recommendations.
In an important symbolic message about the future trajectory of business school research, Harvard
Business School did not receive the first large grant issued by the Ford Foundation. 15 Instead, that honor went to Carnegie's GSIA-a school that had barely been in operation for five years (1950), but whose character expressed, according to the foundation, the ideal-type of what other business schools should aspire to -the training of doctoral students in the application of the behavioral sciences and mathematics to problems of administration (Carroll 1959, p. 156) . As the dispositional logic of habitus would predict, Ford officials-most of whom were academics-were thus contributing to enhance the world they came from by positively sanctioning the scientific, research-oriented (as opposed to practical and vocational) orientation of the GSIA.
Bach also collaborated closely with the Ford and Carnegie foundations in the development of two widely published surveys about the state of business education in the United States. These reports aimed to do
for business education what the Flexner report had done for medical education in 1910. Based on an extensive survey of business education curriculum, students, faculty, and research, the two reports presented the GSIA's model of management education as the template for other business schools. MBA courses were to be taught by disciplinary trained scholars steeped in the latest quantitative methods to study various phenomena of business. Business school faculty should mostly be drawn from academic disciplines such as economics, engineering, mathematics, sociology, psychology, and statistics. Business schools were to restructure their own doctoral programs by grounding students in the basic social science disciplines and direct their research toward more fundamental theory. Finally, research was to be organized around interdisciplinary teams rather than individuals (Crowther-Heyck 2006a , 2006b .
A 1965 examination of the impact of the 1959 Gordon-Howell report noted several changes that signaled the foundation's success in building more research-oriented business faculties (Wheeler 1965) . First, business schools had significantly increased the number of faculty with doctoral degrees, and many had moved toward adopting academic hiring and promotion processes similar to those found in disciplinary departments.
Between 1954 and 1964, for instance, the proportion of fulltime faculty with doctoral degrees at the 25 largest business schools rose from about 69 percent to 83 percent. As a result, the percentage of the largest 25 schools that met AACSB accreditation standards jumped from about 50 percent in 1954 to 100 percent by 1965 (Wheeler 1965) . Second, the next generation of business school professors was now being educated in doctoral programs that emphasized disciplinary foundations and quantitative methods. Business schools began not only to hire faculty members from other business schools but also to actively recruit research-oriented, disciplinetrained faculty from mathematics, economics, and statistics departments. Third, the greater emphasis on published research by schools had led to an increased number of academic outlets for publishing business developed it in the context of a critique of macroeconomics. Prescott, who is also important in this line of analysis, was a student of Lucas at the GSIA, and Kydland, a student of Prescott. 16 It is perhaps not completely surprising that these orientations would develop at the GSIA rather than elsewhere. Being low on symbolic and social capital due to their peripheral location (both geographic and institutional), GSIA economics faculty boosted their academic status by ruthlessly marshalling their scientific purity. Second, Simon's attempt to "preach the heresies of bounded rationality" to the economists may have been instrumental in pushing them to articulate further their (contrary) views on rationality. 17 As Simon described it retrospectively, "I heckled the GSIA economists about their ridiculous assumptions about human omniscience, and they increasingly viewed me as the main obstacle to building "real" economics in the school" (1991; p. 144). 18 By 1965 the school's economists were united enough in their views to cause Simon to quit in disgust and find refuge in the psychology department. Third, a large proportion of the GSIA recruits in economics came either from the center of free-market economics-the University of Chicago-or from close affiliates (Allan Meltzer, for instance, who was a pillar of the GSIA since 1957, is a "second generation"
Chicagoan-his mentor at UCLA and longtime collaborator, Karl Brunner, was a loyal disciple of Friedman-;
all three are key figures of academic monetarism). We may hypothesize that there were not very many top departments hiring Chicago graduates at a time when the domination of Keynesian economics was overwhelming: hence their relegation to a business school, however remarkable. However, as we describe in the next section, this pattern became, over time and through the massive expansion of business schools in the following decades, a considerable source of strength for the broader diffusion of Chicago approaches.
MARKETS TRIUMPHANT
While University of Chicago-trained faculty had shaped the disciplinary trajectory of Carnegie's GSIA, it was not until the late 1950s that the University's own business school took a disciplinary turn. Allen
Wallis, the dean of the Chicago GSB from 1956 to 1962, noted that an earlier attempt to realize this goal had been thwarted by the institution's Chancellor, Robert Maynard Hutchins, who questioned the place of business education at the University and consequently starved the school of resources. Under the new chancellor, Lawrence Klimpton, the effort to restore business school education and research on sounder academic footing was now a priority, Wallis asserted in Chicago's grant application to the Ford Foundation.
W. Allen Wallis was a Columbia-trained statistician, but had spent time in the Chicago economics department during the 1930s. It is there that he started to forge a life-long friendship with two fellow students, Milton Friedman and George Stigler; the three were then united again during the war when all worked at the U.S. Navy-sponsored Statistical Research Group at Columbia University. Partly thanks to Friedman's influence, the University of Chicago recruited Wallis shortly after the war to found the Committee, then Department of Statistics, which soon successfully enlisted the support of the Rockefeller foundation to serve as an engine for the dissemination of statistical methods toward other fields (Olkin 1991) .
Together with associated dean James Lorie (another Chicago-trained economist), Wallis defended the idea that a business school should not be very different from a university: it should be oriented toward further learning, as opposed to vocational training, and should have first rate research. The reformed GSB would draw upon disciplinary faculty who were working in areas most closely related to business-statistics, accounting, law, and, especially, economics. Wallis had extensive control over hiring, and leveraged his own academic reputation to recruit like-minded economists and statisticians. He was described as "shrewd and indeed almost ruthless in carrying out his program" (Gordon to Chamberlain, November 457, FFA 58-140).
An important "coup"-and certainly widely consequential for the business school-was the hiring, Meanwhile the Ford Foundation regarded Chicago as the perfect place to promote the approach to business education that had been pioneered by Carnegie's GSIA (Wallis' connections to the foundation world certainly helped). Foundation officials felt that, to some extent, the Chicago Graduate School of Business was an even better candidate for their program. Unlike the GSIA, it was embedded inside one of America's best universities. As one Ford Foundation administrator wrote about the decision to make economics the center of Chicago's business education, the GSB now "offers a program in business education that is more nearly professional than is characteristic of much business education in that it offers a training which cannot readily be acquired simply by doing and which might genuinely distinguish the business school educated businessman from those who have not had the advantage of such training." [1958, FFA] The GSB thus received the second (after GSIA) largest grant as one of Ford's centers of excellence.
The scientific status for their program and to control the production of a massive amount of research (…) regardless of the difficulties involved in relating economic models of perfect markets in equilibrium to stock market price changes and similar phenomena" (Whitley 1986, p. 173) . Thus Chicago finance's perhaps most well-known product, the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970) , asserted in its strong form that the prices of securities always perfectly reflect all known information. Consequently, it is impossible to game the market and predict what the future value of a stock may be-rather, the movement of stock prices is a "random walk" (Fama 1965) . Hence a firm's stock price is the best reflector of that firm's fundamental economic value.
As MacKenzie (2006) deftly shows, this view did not sit very well, at least initially, with practitioners and old finance types, who were used to think of themselves as clever analysts with a lot of intuition. 23 Nonetheless, the mastery of the language and techniques of financial economics soon became a credentialing device for practitioners in the financial markets and led many business schools to move beyond training general managers to training professional investors, especially in the areas of private equity, leverage buy-out firms, and hedge funds.
More importantly, perhaps, efficient markets theory had important consequences for the way corporations were viewed and run. At bottom, the theory was rooted in Milton Friedman's belief that the purpose of the corporation was to maximize financial value ("business", Friedman (1970) famously said, has "no other social responsibility than to increase profits"). Financial economists saw the large diversified conglomerates that dominated the American economic landscape as examples of managerial behavior that decreased the market value of firms and therefore were harmful to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen and Ruback 1983) . They took from efficient markets theory the notion that the total market value of a firm's shares accurately predicts the firm's future expected cash flows. The theory thus provided a rationale for subjecting corporate strategy and managerial action to the discipline of shareholders, which led its proponents to endorse the vast expansion in the market for corporate control that took place in the 1980s (Dobbin and Zorn 2005) . Second, the theory also offered an argument for compensating managers on the basis of stock and stock options-a quite revolutionary idea at a time when salaries were rarely aligned on share price. Finally, since a basic assumption was that stock price reflects the fundamental value of the firm, then raising stock price should be the exclusive focus of managers' actions. Together, these propositions came to be known as "agency theory."
AGENCY THEORY AND THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN REVERSE
The strength of the Chicago GSB was the close connection (indeed deep interpenetration, since a large proportion of the faculty ended up with joint appointments in both) 24 to the economics department. The famous Chicago workshop system helped reinforce these relations. Starting in the mid 1960s, the two institutions jointly set up a Center for Mathematical Studies in Business and Economics (Emmett 2007) . Not only was the Chicago economics department one of the world's premiers, but it trained large numbers of graduate students. As we have seen, many of them would end up in business schools-of particular importance were the GSIA, where Robert Lucas got his first job; another one was the University of Rochester.
In 1963, shortly after launching the first phase of the curricular reforms at the Chicago GSB, Allen
Wallis assumed the presidency of the University of Rochester-a job he would hold for 20 years. Meckling argued, managers will fail to work towards stockholder goals. The challenge, they concluded, is thus to create an "alignment of incentives" in which managers' personal financial interests will come into close correspondence with those of owners. Much of the discussions in these early papers focus on the means by which owners (for example, shareholders) can effectively align these interests. Agency theorists emphasized three mechanisms: monitoring managerial performance, providing comprehensive economic incentives, and promoting an active market for corporate control. Monitoring managerial behavior involves the deployment of complex accounting practices and the appointment of a professional board of directors whose members operate in the stockholders' interest by virtue of their need to maintain their personal reputations. The alignment of incentives involves remunerating management in the form of company stock and stock options, so that managers and owners face exactly the same incentives, and hence self-interested managers will maximize shareholder value as a byproduct of maximizing their own material gain. The market for corporate control leads to stock prices reflecting firm fundamentals, and ensures that poorly performing "insiders" will be threatened and ultimately replaced by efficiency and profit-oriented "outsiders."
Agency theory quickly created a unified approach to organizations and corporate governance in American business schools, catalyzing academic revolutions in corporate finance, organizational behavior, accounting, corporate governance, and the market for corporate control. Unlike much of the earlier scholarship in business schools, the core ideas of agency theory were not derived from inductive observation and practical experience, but instead, through the theoretical musings of a newly revitalized neoclassical economic theory.
In the early 1970s it thus brought a theoretical, deductive approach to business school research, the lack of which had concerned the academics-dominated Ford and Carnegie Foundations and haunted business education from the start. Drawing on the legitimacy of economics, agency theory in the business school had the authority to redefine managerial action and the nature of the corporation, setting in motion a real "managerial revolution in reverse," whereby managers were transformed, both symbolically and materially, into major corporate owners.
What gave particular visibility and influence to agency theorists like Jensen and his colleagues was that-unlike many of their disciplinary brethren but certainly very much in line with a certain Chicago taste (promoted, for instance, by Friedman, Stigler or Hayek) for political activism-they made considerable effort to disseminate their ideas and findings not only through traditional academic channels, such as journals and professional meetings, but into the classroom and the wider world of practice. They skillfully connected their ideas to explain the changing corporate environment and offered a prescriptive set of approaches to improve corporate profitability. Given the dramatic expansion of the consulting market in finance, accounting, and management over the same period, the financial spillovers of these activities were also not negligible. Journal that helped legitimate the takeover movement, encouraged the proliferation of executive stock options to align incentives between executives and shareholders, and argued that leveraging corporations with debt was the best way to discipline supposedly wasteful managers. Institutional Investor in 1985 remarked on the economic sense-making that Jensen provided for the hostile takeover movement, writing that Jensen "has come out in favor of corporate raiders and greenmailers to the point of developing an economic rationale for takeovers." 27 Jensen argued that the deregulation that enabled hostile takeovers had resulted in a more efficient market within the US economy for the right to control corporate assets. He stated that managers, who are unable to keep their companies efficient, as primarily measured by the firm's stock price, will suffer the consequences in the form of a takeover. Jensen framed the market for corporate control as one in which alternative managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources, and he stated that takeover entrepreneurs and imaginative investment bankers will continue to prosper. Jensen described takeover artists, like T. Boone Pickens, not as financial speculators, but as "inventors." 28 Frank Dobbin and Dirk Zorn (2005, p. 187) suggest that Jensen's published article on the takeover movement helped legitimize takeover activity by presenting it as a type of societal service that "convinced the world that what [takeover artists] did for a living, far from threatening the corporation, was efficient: that it was in the interest of the shareholder and the broader public interest." It is only later that corporate scandals showed that options, strike prices, and preferred stock had revealed themselves to be mere conventions for facilitating fraud. In the meantime, however, these activities took on a fetishistic character, making the stock price of a company appear as an end in itself.
Organizations, such as the Business Roundtable, a group of the chief executives of the largest US companies that actively shapes business policy, changed its corporate governance policy from advocating a "stakeholder view" in corporate decision-making to the "shareholder" maximization imperative.
THE LINKED ECOLOGIES OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS
Over a century ago, a vanguard of (in many cases) European-educated economists founded business schools with the aim to promote a better integration of business with American society, sometimes pressing for an explicitly reformist social agenda in the process. From then on, business schools became one of the key organizational vehicles for the crafting, transmission, reproduction, and change of conceptions regarding the place of corporations and their managers in the American cultural landscape. 29 By constructing management as a profession, business schools infused large organizations and their managers with legitimacy in shaping the new social order. This acceptance of managerial authority was, in a sense, America's cultural revolution. This would suggest that, as increasingly large proportions of managers went through these institutions over time, the skills, outlooks, and habits forged in the business school environment have become ever more closely integrated into corporate practices and understandings.
Paradoxically, however, the evolution of American business schools over the long run also displays a move in the other direction-toward increasingly abstract and technical knowledge rooted in the social scientific disciplines, most specifically economics, even financial economics. As we have seen, philanthropic foundations, whose boards were generally filled with academics or people with strong academic connections, were instrumental in spearheading this "scientific" transformation, which achieved its most spectacular results at the GSIA and at the Chicago Graduate School of Business. Consequently, business schools became increasingly intertwined with the long-term evolution of economic thought and technique over the course of the twentieth century, as both recipients and agents of scientific and intellectual change. We can see evidence of this in the growing academic prominence of business school faculty within the economics mainstream or in the increasingly common practice of joint appointments.
But it is useful to remember that things used to be different. Well into the 1960s business school appointments were much less prestigious than departmental appointments for economists. Hence the entrenchment of certain fields (finance), and certain approaches (monetarism, rational expectations, agency theory) in business schools as opposed to economics department denoted their (initially) somewhat marginal or heterodox status relative to the mainstream of the discipline. (Admittedly, it also underscores the more natural connections between these institutions and the corporate world, which often served as a financial backer of intellectual enterprises seen as politically supportive (Stigler's Walgreen Fund) or materially useful (the creation of the Center for Research on Security Prices at the Chicago GSB, or the Wharton forecasting unit). )
In particular, the GSIA (in the 1950s and 1960s mainly) and the University of Rochester (in the 1970s and 1980s) served as laboratories of sorts for people who, to some extent, operated on the paradigmatic edges of the economics profession and sought, consciously or unconsciously, to bridge their distance from the center of the field by engaging in forms of scientific overcompensation. Contemporaries, for instance, commented on the purist culture at Carnegie and Rochester. One member of the Carnegie GSIA during the late 1950s put it in the following way: "the search for the truth was a core value. The intellectual atmosphere was more than just lively, open, and confrontational. I had found plenty of all those at Chicago, but there the debate was carried on in House of Commons style. There the purpose, I always felt, was more to be clever than to be right. Who had the sharpest wit? The most biting retort?" (Levitt 2004, p. 290) Part of the self-righteousness displayed in this quote may be explained, on the one hand, by the perception of embattlement faced by these methodological and theoretical positions in a generally unfriendly profession, and, on the other, by a thriving for institutional and personal status (Indeed when Michael Jensen moved to Harvard Business School, it was perceived by some of his collaborators as a "sell-out"). 30 In a field that rewards scientific prowess above anything else, the strategy paid in the end. The institutional study of people in industrial settings gave way to more technical approaches to management based on decision theory and the early use of computers. Later, traditional macroeconomics was downed because rational expectations theorists argued that its microeconomic foundations were scientifically weak. Traditional finance was killed by financial economics for pretty much the same reasons. By the end of the process, the foundations of both economics and business knowledge had been deeply transformed, with powerful economic and social consequences for how American corporations ought to be run. The new theories provided a new language, new categories of understanding and action, which not only became naturalized in the teachings of American business schools, but came to sustain, and perhaps initiate, profound redefinitions in the nature of American corporations and markets.
